University of Miami Law Review
Volume 41

Number 4

Article 3

3-1-1987

Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982:
Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist Acts
Linda A. Lacewell
Paul A. Shelowitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

Recommended Citation
Linda A. Lacewell and Paul A. Shelowitz, Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982:
Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 823 (1987)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol41/iss4/3

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

CASE COMMENT
Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections

1981 and 1982: Shifting the Focus from
Racial Status to Racist Acts
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................
DIVINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT .......................................

823
826

A. The Historical Context and the Language of the Act ....................
B. JudicialInterpretationof the Act ............. .......................

826
829
834
835
836
836
837
841
842
844

III. THE M EANING OF "RACE"...............................................
A. Race as a Taxonomical Construct ....................................
B. Race as a Popular Construct ........................................
C. In the Lower Federal Courts-The Group-Based Rules ..................
1. MATTER OF LAw-Shaare Tefila .................................
2. QUESTION OF FACT-Al-Khazraji .................................
a. Identifying Races ...........................................
b. Com mon Perception .........................................
IV.

COMMENT ................................................................ 845

A. Learningfrom the Lower Courts-Problemswith the Group-Based Rules .. 846
B. Beyond the Lower Courts-The Casefor a Racial Content Analysis .......
848
V.

C ONCLUSION .........................................................

I.

853

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 18661 in response to the
rampant racial discrimination existing in the South following the abo-

lition of slavery.2 Section 1 of the Act is now codified at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981 and 1982. 3 Section 1981 guarantees to "all persons" the same

'4
general rights of contract and equal protection as "white citizens."
Section 1982 guarantees to "all citizens" the same property rights as
1. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19811982 (1982)).
2. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982). This Comment analyzes sections 1981 and 1982 (the
modern versions of the Act) together because the courts generally construe them together. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 171 (1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973).
4. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
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"white citizens."' 5 In the Reconstruction context, it is apparent that
Congress's immediate goal was to provide protection to the newly
freed blacks.' The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
the statutes also protect white persons who have suffered discrimination because of their race.' The unsettled issue, however, is whether
plaintiffs who cannot claim status as whites or blacks can seek protection under the statutes.
The federal courts have been remarkably inconsistent about the
coverage of nonracially identified plaintiffs under sections 1981 and
1982. The inconsistency is not surprising because the courts lack
definitive guidelines necessary for decision-making. They simply cannot be certain which groups Congress intended to protect.9 Both the
terms of the statutes and the legislative history are broad, ambiguous,
and contradictory."° The courts have attempted to define race in
terms of the predominant dichotomies of white, black, and other
color-defined groupings. But this effort is misguided because race is
an inherently irrational and subjective concept."
This Term, the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict among
subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
5. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in

every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).

6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
7. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
8. Cf Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 US.C § 1985(3): A Limiting
Strategy Gone Awry?, 84 MICH. L. REV.88, 107 (1985) ("The class-based animus requirement
of section 1985(3) has a long and torturous history. Broad language, a massive and
meandering legislative history, and a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court have
contributed to arbitrary decisions, uncertainty, and often unworkable or illogical standards.").
9. Although the passage of the Act was prompted by the existence of rampant
discrimination against the newly freed blacks one hundred years ago, the Act does not
explicitly mention blacks. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-63 and accompanying text. The sections begin with broad
references to "all persons" (section 1981) and "all citizens" (section 1982), and end with
ambiguous references to "white citizens." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982.
11. See infra notes 70-86 and accompanying text. Although the statutes are not expressly
limited to racial discrimination, the Supreme Court of the United States has frequently
indicated in dicta that they are so limited. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (Section 1981 covers white plaintiffs because of "the racial character
of the rights being protected."); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60
(1975) (Section 1981 covers employment discrimination "on the basis of race."); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (Section 1982 "deals only with racial
discrimination and does not address itself to discrimination on grounds of religion or national
origin."); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) ("Congress intended to protect a limited
category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality."). The lower courts have
therefore attempted to define race in order to determine whom the statutes protect.
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the lower courts on the proper scope of the statutes.
v. Saint Francis College,'3

2

In Al-Khazraji

the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

held that an Arab could sue under section 1981 because the racial
status of the plaintiff is a question of fact to be determined at trial. In
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,'4 the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit held that Jews could not sue under section 1982,
despite the defendants' perception that the plaintiffs belonged to a sep-5
arate race, because, as a matter of law, Jews do not constitute a race.'
Considering the breadth of the statutory language, the ambiguity
of the legislative history, and the disparate definitions of race, the
Supreme Court can easily legitimize any decision it chooses to make.
If the Court is to find a principled basis for its decision, however, it
must look beyond an overly technical construction of legislative
intent. This Comment proposes that the Court construe the statutes
broadly in order to redress all racial discrimination. Because the federal government is the primary protector of civil rights,' 6 the Court
should read the 1866 Act broadly as a remedial statute 7 designed to
address the entrenched but nonstatic problem of discrimination. In
effect, the Court has already done so by construing the statutes to
cover whites.'I It would be both inconsistent and counterintuitive to
hold that the statutes do not cover ethnic or minority groups who,
12. The Court last addressed this issue in 1976 in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (allowing whites, as a "race," to sue under section
1981).
13. 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986).
14. 785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 62 (1986).
15. A claim of religious or national origin discrimination might have been brought under
section 1983, which is not limited to racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The
Supreme Court has held, however, that a section 1983 action may be brought only if the
defendant acted with state authority or under color of state law. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 838 (1982). The plaintiffs did not seek a remedy under section 1983 because the
defendants were private actors without apparent state authority.
16. The passage of the fourteenth amendment and the civil rights acts radically altered the
federal system. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961) (partially overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
for its holding that municipalities are not subject to suit under § 1983). By failing to redress
the massive inequities of private racial discrimination after the Civil War, the states had
abdicated their essential role as the protectors of individual rights. Id. Congress therefore
responded by enacting a remedial scheme that made the federal government the primary
protector of civil rights. Id.
17. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-34 (1961); Foy, Some
Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied PrivateActions in the State and Federal
Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 523 (1986); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation""43
HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
When both the text and legislative history are ambiguous, the courts may consider the
ultimate purpose of the legislation and apply the text accordingly. This is known as the
"proliferation of purpose" principle. Foy, supra, at 523.
18. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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more often than majority whites, are subjected to racial discrimination because of societal conventions that treat race predominantly in
color-defined terms. The Court should read the statutes to remedy
the injury of racial discrimination, regardless of the victim's racial
status.

The section that follows canvasses the legislative and judicial history of the 1866 Act and demonstrates the problematic nature of reliance on congressional intent. The next section discusses the courts'
use of definitions of race to determine the scope of the statutes. The
final section identifies factors that courts should consider in resolving
questions of coverage under these statutes.
II.

DIVINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT

In the traditional model, a court simply applies the law to the
facts of the case.' 9 When a plaintiff invokes statutory protection, the
court first examines the text of the statute to determine if the plaintiff
falls within its coverage.2 ° If the text does not expressly delineate the
scope of coverage, the court resorts to the legislative history of the
statute in an attempt to divine legislative intent.2 ' In determining the
scope of protection under sections 1981 and 1982, however, neither
the text nor the legislative history has proven dispositive. The court
thus can only decide22the case by making normative judgments in the
interpretive process.
A.

The Historical Context and the Language of the Act

In 1864, Congress passed the thirteenth amendment, declaring
that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ...shall exist within

the United States."'23 The badges and incidents of slavery continued
19. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 138 (1803); Foy, supra note 17, at
506-08.
20. Foy, supra note 17, at 519.
21. Id. at 520. Attempting to determine legislative intent to answer a question not
specifically addressed in the text may prove to be futile because, as one commentator has
stated, "[t]he silence of the text probably means that the legislature did not consider the issue."
Id. For discussion of the problem of determining legislative intent, see R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 137-68 (1975); Dickerson, Statutory

Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983); Grabow,
Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative
Ventures", 64 B.U.L. REV. 737 (1984). Cf Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 469, 477 (1981) ("[T]here is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be
discovered, even in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to be invented.").
22. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword. The Formsof Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1979) (discussing the general ambiguity of constitutional provisions).
23. The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
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to exist in society, however, in the form of racial discrimination. Several Southern states enacted Black Codes defining the inferior status
of blacks relative to other groups.24 Blacks also encountered private
discrimination in areas such as housing, employment, restaurants,
and public accommodations. 25 Congress responded by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.26
The Senate version of the bill declared that all citizens "of every
race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude," have the same contract and property rights,
and the same right to equal protection of the law. 27 The House
amended the bill to indicate that the rights protected were the same as
those "enjoyed by white citizens."'2 8 The legislative debates centered
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. In passing this amendment, Congress was responding in part to
questions about the validity of the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29, 39 (1980).
24. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 83-90 (2d ed. 1973). The Black
Codes were state statutes segregating blacks and whites in public facilities and private facilities
open to the public, including public carriers, railroad trains, travel facilities, local transportation facilities, streetcars, and horsecars.
Parks, hospitals, prisons, courthouses; all had segregated toilets, drinking
fountains, seating arrangements, stairways, waiting rooms, entrances and exitseven telephone booths. Segregation of cemetaries was de rigueur, and New
Orleans even deemed it in the public welfare to enact an ordinance separating
Negro and white prostitutes.
Id. at 83.
25. See id. at 83-124. One commentator described the post-Civil War society as follows:
The law had created two worlds, so separate that communication between them
was almost impossible. Separation bred suspicion and hatred, fostered rumors
and misunderstanding, and created conditions that made extremely difficult any
steps toward its reduction. Legal segregation was so complete that a southern
white minister was moved to remark that it "made of our eating and drinking,
our buying and selling, our labor and housing, our rents, our railroads, our
orphanages and prisons, our recreations, our very institutions of religion, a
problem of race as well as a problem of maintenance."
Franklin, History of Racial Segregation in the United States, in 34 ANNALS 1, 8 (1956), quoted
in D. BELL, supra note 24, at 83-84.
26. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19811982 (1982)). For a historical discussion of the role of Civil War and Reconstruction events on
the Constitution, see H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION (1973).
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 573 (1866).
28. Id. at 1366, 1413-16. The final text of section 1 of the Act provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
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around congressional authority to create substantive civil rights under
the thirteenth amendment, 29 and the propriety of federal invasion into
areas traditionally in the states' domain.3 ° Opponents of the bill took
the narrow view that the thirteenth amendment did no more than
abolish slavery, and that the legislation violated principles of federalism. 31 Proponents of the bill, however, claimed that the enforcement
clause of the amendment authorized Congress to enact all legislation
necessary to eradicate the vestiges of slavery.3 2
Congress responded to this uncertainty surrounding the scope of
congressional authority under the thirteenth amendment by passing
the fourteenth amendment. 3 The ratification of the fourteenth
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, regulation,
or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1982)). President Johnson vetoed the bill because he believed that Congress intended the Act
to apply to Chinese, Indians, Gypsies, and blacks. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1679.
Johnson also maintained that the proposed legislation would infringe upon the state courts'
power. Id. at 1679-81. Congress voted to override Johnson's veto. Id. at 1809, 1861.
29. The Supreme Court has since stated that the thirteenth amendment does in fact give
Congress the power to create these rights. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
30. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1324-25 (1952).
31. For example, Senator Saulsbury of Delaware described the effect of the amendment as
follows:
[T]hat a person who heretofore was a slave of another shall be no longer his
slave, and it operates no further. It bestows no rights further than to relieve him
from the burdens of servitude and slavery. A man may be a free man and not
possess the same civil rights as other men.
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 477.
32. Senator Howard of Michigan stated: "[I]t was in contemplation [of the drafters of the
amendment] to give to Congress precisely the power over the subject of slavery and the
freedmen which is proposed to be exercised by the bill now under consideration." Id. at 503.
Senator Trumbull of Illinois, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, stated:
This measure is intended to give effect to [the thirteenth amendment] and secure
to all persons within the United States practical freedom. They deny them
certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the
very restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence
of slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all these discriminations.
Id. at 474. He believed that the bill would "break down all discrimination between black men
and white men." Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
33. The fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
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amendment removed any doubt as to the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,11 and may have even incorporated the guaranties
of the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution itself.35 Once the
amendment was passed, Congress reenacted the 1866 Act as an
addendum to section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.36
B.

JudicialInterpretation of the Act

Virtually no suits were brought under the Civil Rights Act of
1866 during the first hundred years after its enactment 37 because the
Supreme Court initially applied the enforcement clause of the thir39
38
teenth amendment to state action only. In the Civil Rights Cases,
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 & n.14 (1948) ("aiding to remove all doubt upon
this power of Congress") (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2961); see CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 27, at 2461, 2498, 2506, 2511, 2896, 3035.
35. The Hurd Court remarked that the amendment "incorporate[d] the guaranties of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of the land." Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. at 32. The
Court quoted Congressman Thayer: "As I understand it, [the fourteenth amendment] is but
incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the principle of the civil rights bill which
has lately become a law ... in order ... that that provision ... so necessary for the protection
of the fundamental rights of citizenship, shall be forever incorporated in the Constitution of
the United States." Id. at 32 & n.13 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2465); see also
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2459, 2462, 2961 (remarks of proponents); id. at 2467, 2538
(remarks of opponents); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9496 (1908).
36. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 1408 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982 (1982)).
37. See Note, Dead-End Street: Discrimination, The Thirteenth Amendment, and Section
1982, 58 CHL-KENT L. REV. 873 (1982). In 1961, only one half of one percent of all civil
cases filed in federal court were civil rights cases. By contrast, in 1981, one sixth of all civil
cases filed in federal court were civil rights cases. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 22A (4th ed. 1983) (citing table C2 of the 1961, and tables 20, 21, and 29 of the

1981, Annual Reporter of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). This
increase in litigation is also attributable to rulings of the Supreme Court applying provisions of
the Bill of Rights to the states by incorporating the provisions into the fourteenth amendment,

and to the Supreme Court ruling in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), authorizing section
1983 damages actions against persons acting "under color of state law" but outside actual state
authorization. Id.
38. See Larson, The Development ofSection 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discriminationin
Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29, 57 (1972); cf Note, supra note 8, at 89

(discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), another civil rights statute enacted pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment).
Despite its broad language, the statute was rendered largely impotent soon after
its enactment by a series of hostile Supreme Court decisions. It languished in

relative obscurity until 1971, when the Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Breckenridge,
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the Court held that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments in enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1875,40 which prohibited discrimination in public accommodations. The Court's narrow construction of the thirteenth amendment
effectively precluded the application of the enforcement clause
through the civil rights acts to reach private racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its restrictive reading of the thirteenth amendment two decades later in Hodges v. United States.4" In
Hodges, the Court reversed the convictions of three white men
charged with conspiracy to oppress and discriminate against blacks to
drive them from employment. The Court held that the thirteenth
amendment was not intended to apply to private discrimination.4 2
This construction implicitly compounded the narrow scope of the
civil rights acts.
The Court finally faced the state action issue squarely in Corrigan v. Buckley.43 In Corrigan, a white plaintiff brought an action to
enforce a restrictive covenant that denied to blacks the ability to
purchase certain properties. On the black defendant's motion to dismiss the action, the Court construed sections 1981 and 1982:
[I]t is obvious, upon their face, that while [the statutes] provide,
inter alia, that all persons and citizens shall have equal right with
white citizens to make contracts and acquire property, they, like
the Constitutional Amendment under whose sanction they were
enacted, do not in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts
entered into by private individuals in respect to the control and
disposition of their own property.44
The 1968 Supreme Court, however, eliminated the state action
requirement in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.45 In Jones, black prospective buyers sued private property owners under section 1982 challenging their business policy against selling houses to blacks. The
Court ruled that Congress may provide a remedy for private discrimination under the thirteenth amendment. In this landmark decision,
breathed new life into the statute by relaxing a formerly rigid state action
requirement.
Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)).
39. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19811982 (1982)).
41. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
42. The Court stated that the Act was not intended "to denounce every act done to an
individual which was wrong if done to a free man and yet justified in a condition of slavery,
and to give authority to Congress to enforce such denunciation." Hodges, 203 U.S. at 19.
43. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
44. Id. at 331.
45. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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the Court held that "[s]ection 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the
statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise
of the power of Congress to
' 46
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Jones case is perhaps the most important interpretation of
the 1866 Act since its inception. The decision renewed the guaranty
of equal rights under the law, 47 but, at the same time, left the potential reach of the statutes in a state of uncertainty. To support its
broad construction, the Court relied almost exclusively on the broad
language and ambiguous legislative history of the Act.48 The Court
declared that the language of the Act "[i]n plain and unambiguous
terms," granted to all citizens the right to hold and purchase property.49 The Court concluded that the Act prohibited discrimination
in the sale or rental of property, whether by private owners or public
authorities.
The Court focused on statements from the legislative debates
tending to indicate that Congress intended to reach private action. 0
In this manner, the Court managed to extract authority that supported an expansive reading of congressional intent. In contrast, Justice Harlan's dissent focused on statements from the very same
debates that supported his view that Congress did not intend to cover
private discrimination. His view was that "those debates do not...
overwhelmingly support the result reached by the Court, and in fact
that a contrary conclusion may equally well be drawn."'" To support
46. Id. at 413. The Court stated:

And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to
buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery....

At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can
buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that

being a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment
made a promise the Nation cannot keep.
Id. at 442-43.
47. See infra note 55.

48. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 420-36. The Court did cite Hurd v. Hodge for the proposition
that a black citizen who is denied the opportunity to purchase the home of his choice "[s]olely
because of [his] race and color," has suffered the kind of injury that section 1982 was designed
to prevent. Id. at 419 (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948)). But in relying on Hurd
to support its contention that Congress intended the statute to apply to private actions, the
Court neglected to address the statements the Hurd Court made on precisely this issue: "[T]he
statute does not invalidate private restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of those

agreements are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the terms. The action
toward which the provisions of the statute under consideration is directed is governmental
action." Hurd, 334 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
49. Jones, 392 U.S. at 420.
50. See id. at 431-34.
51. Id. at 454.
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his conclusion, Justice Harlan referred to remarks of the Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee discussing the detrimental effects of the
state-enacted Black Codes on southern blacks.5 2 After citing numerous other statements that evidenced legislative intent to limit the
breadth of the Act to state action, 53 Justice Harlan concluded that if

any intent could be derived, it was the intent that the Act apply to
state action only.54
The Court's reading of the legislative history generated intense
controversy." The Court decided Jones in 1968 at the peak of the
civil rights movement, when society had come to regard private discrimination against blacks as intolerable.5 6 When the opportunity
arose for the Court to address the situation, it recognized society's
disapproval of racial discrimination and responded by reading the
underlying spirit of the statutes to provide a remedy.
In the years following Jones, the Court continued to expand the

scope of the statutes.57 In Runyon v. McCrary," the Court held that a
52. Id. at 458.
53. Justice Harlan quoted Senator Trumbull's statement which strongly indicated that the
purpose of the bill was to abolish the discriminatory laws of state legislatures in several of the
southern states:
[This bill] may be assailed as drawing to the Federal Government powers that
properly belong to the "States"; but I apprehend, rightly considered, it is not
obnoxious to that objection. It will have no operation in any State where the
laws are equal, where all persons have the same civil rights without regard to
color or race. It will have no operation in the State of Kentucky when her slave
code and all her laws discriminating between persons on account of race or color
shall be abolished.
Id. at 459 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 476).
54. Id. at 473.
55. See, e.g., Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death
Knell nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV.
1333 (1980); Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima
Facie Case of Race Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207 (1979);
Note, Constitutional Law-Civil Rights Act of 1866-New Strength for an Old Law, 18 DE
PAUL L. REV. 284 (1968); Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29 (1980).
56. See R. BLUMBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 1960's FREEDOM STRUGGLE 99-117 (1984)

(chronologizing the peak of the civil rights movement and its effect on the enactment of the
1964 Civil Rights Act).
57. Following the Jones decision, the statute regained force and was soon used to further
expand protection against discrimination. The Court applied the "badge of slavery" concept
in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), to strike down a corporation bylaw
that restricted the assignability of membership shares in the corporation, and in Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), to protect against the
discriminatory practices of a private club. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, the Court
held that the Act afforded a remedy against racial discrimination in private employment. 421
U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). The Court further held that the remedy provided by section 1981 was
"separate from and independent of" those remedies provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 466. The notion that Congress has broad authority to determine the "badges of slavery,"
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private school could not exclude qualified applicants under section
1981 based solely on their race. 5 9 Justice Stevens put it directly:
"[E]ven if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the
Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense
of justice today. . . . [M]y understanding of the mores of today [is
such] that I think the Court is entirely correct in adhering to Jones."6 0
The Court last considered the scope of the statutes in McDonald
v. Santa Fe TransportationCo. 6 In McDonald, the Court held that
section 1981 affords a remedy to white employees who suffer racially
discriminatory treatment in private employment. 62 The Court based
its expansive holding on the broad language and ambiguous history of
the 1866 Act 63 and the underlying congressional objective to remedy
racial discrimination.
Relying on the legislative history, the McDonald Court concluded that the amendment incorporating the "white citizens" clause
does not limit the classes protected, but rather defines the nature of
the rights protected.64 Some Congressmen feared that without the
amendment the Act might be construed to extend to females and
minors.6 5 Such a construction would not have been in keeping with
Congress's paramount goal of redressing racial discrimination. The
Court has stated that "Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality." '66 Congress added the "white citizens" clause "apparently to emphasize the
and then to legislate accordingly to eliminate them was rejected in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), and reborn in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
58. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
59. Id. at 168-75. The majority held that section 1981 was a reenactment of both section
16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 168 n.8.
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, claimed that section 1981 derived solely from section
16 of the 1870 Act and was therefore based on the fourteenth amendment, which required
state action. Id. at 205-06.
60. Id. at. 191-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
62. Id. at 278-85.
63. See id. at 287-96.
64. Id. at 291-93; Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). The Court's holding that
the "white citizens" language of the Act does not limit the classes of protected persons to
nonwhites has generated some criticism. See, e.g., Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent
Remedy": The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employment
Discrimination, 50 S.CAL. L. REV. 961, 984 (1977); Note, The Thirteenth Amendment and
Private Affirmative Action, 89 YALE L.J. 399 (1979).
65. After the amendment was adopted, the floor manager of the bill in the House
explained that "it was thought by some persons that unless these qualifying words were
incorporated in the bill, those rights might be extended to all citizens, whether male or female,
majors or minors." McDonald, 427 U.S. at 293 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 157
(remarks of Rep. Wilson)).
66. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
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racial character of the rights being protected." 6 7 Congress viewed it
''simply as a technical adjustment without substantive effect," and
adopted it without objection or debate. 68 The amendment's sponsor
himself urged passage of the bill as amended "to protect our citizens,
from the highest to the lowest, from the whitest to the blackest, in the
'69
enjoyment of the great fundamental rights which belong to all men."

III.

THE MEANING OF "RACE"

The text and legislative history of sections 1981 and 1982 do not
delineate the scope of intended coverage.7" The Supreme Court has
only described the 1866 Act as one designed to redress "racial discrimination" without indicating the meaning of this term. 7' As a
result, the lower courts have resorted to disparate definitions of race
in an effort to determine the classes of persons protected under the
statutes.
Modern physical anthropological studies, however, indicate that
"race" can never be a precise way to categorize human beings.72 Race
73
is not a term that consistently permits objective application.
" 'Race' is not a fact; it is a concept, and one which by no means has
the same meaning for every biologist today."' 74 The concept of race is
67. Id.
68. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1976). Rep. Wilson of
Iowa, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and the bill's floor manager in the House,
proposed the amendment as soon as the bill was introduced. His stated reason for the change
was to "perfect" the bill technically. Id. at 291.
69. Id. at 293 n.23 (emphasis added) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1118).
70. See supra notes 19-63 and accompanying text.
71. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.

409, 413 (1968). The races of the parties before the Court to date have been limited to blacks
and whites, and for that reason the Court has not had to define the term "race" or "racial
discrimination." In Jones, however, the Court did apply the statute in a sweeping manner:
"[Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866] was meant to prohibit all racially motivated
deprivations of the rights emumerated in the statute." 392 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added).
72. E.g., C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 3-10 (1985); Littlefield, Lieberman &
Reynolds, Redefining Race. The Potential Demise of a Concept in Physical Anthropology, 23
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 641 (1982). Contra Lundsgaarde, Racial and Ethnic
Classifications: An Appraisal of the Role of Anthropology in the Lawmaking Process, 10 HoUs.
L. REV. 641 (1973) (anthropological perspective arguing that the courts should incorporate
scientific theories into decision-making).
73. S. MOLNAR, RACES, TYPES, AND ETHNIC GROUPS 13 (1975) ("Just what constitutes a

race is a hard question to answer, since one's classification usually depends on the purpose of
the classification.
...); cf C. LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 72, at 10-11 (noting cultural
relativity of all anthropological observations).
74. Hiernaux, Problems of Race Definition, 17 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 115 (1965). For
background discussion of the history of the race concept, see T. GOSSETT, RACE: THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1963); J. HALLER, OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION:
SCIENTIFIC ATrITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 (1971); R. HORSMAN, RACE
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found in two realms-science and society. In science, race was conceived as a taxonomical device, grouping people according to genetic
or physical differentiating traits." In society, race describes the
grouping of people according to physical and cultural distinguishing
traits. In both realms, the concept of race expresses subjective group
comparisons.
A.

Race as a Taxonomical Construct

Biologists subdivide people into groups whose members inherit
distinguishing physical characteristics. 76 The three basic biological

classifications are Negroid, Caucasian, and Mongoloid.7 7 Within

these three divisions, attempts at scientific racial classifications fail.78
Indeed, since the 1970's, most physical anthropologists agree that
race in general is not a valid taxonomical device. 79 The lines drawn
between "racial" groups are necessarily subjective and arbitrary
because they depend on which traits and combination of traits the
classifier chooses to isolate to identify subgroups.8 0 But there is no
scientific consensus on meaningful determinative traits. In fact, there
is no subgroup that is sufficiently isolated genetically to remain distinct.8 ' Because of the intermixing of humanity's genetic stock and
the resulting overlap of physical traits between groups, attempts at
racial classification are entirely futile.82 Hence, even those scientists
who insist on formulating lists of "races" based on the sharing of
some isolated traits emphasize that their "list of 30 'races' might have
been ten or 50; the line of discrimination in many cases is arbitrary. .

.

. [R]ace is not a static thing at all . .

.

. History,83 in the

biological as well as the cultural sense, is always in motion.

AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM (1981);
J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970); W. STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S
SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-59 (1960); A. THOMAS &
S. SILLEN, RACISM AND PSYCHIATRY (1972); W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF

RACE (1978).
75. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
76. A. MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 4-5

(5th

ed. 1974).
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. Id. at 5-11.
79. See Littlefield, Lieberman & Reynolds, supra note 72, at 641.
80. See Brace, On the Race Concept, 5 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 313 (1964).
81. See Montagu, The Concept of Race, in THE CONCEPT OF RACE 16-17 (A. Montagu ed.

1964).
82. See A. MONTAGU, supra note 76, at 7.
83. C. COON, S. GARN & J. BIRDSELL, RACES: A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF RACE
FORMATION IN MAN

140 (1950).
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B. Race as a PopularConstruct
"Race as a popular construct" refers to culturally defined groupings of humans according to differentiating physical and/or cultural

traits. Historically, immigrants and other minorities were classified
into "races" according to national origin and skin pigmentation,84
neither of which are correct in biological or even cultural terms. Pos-

sible groupings of people are as numerous as the human mind can
imagine.85 Often, cultural differences alone are enough to cause society to group people into a separate "race."81 6 Other times, ancestry of
any degree is treated as a sufficient determinant.8 7 Thus, the popular
''race" construct varies according to the perceptions of the society in
which it is based.
C.

In the Lower Federal Courts-The Group-Based Rules

Inasmuch as "race" defies definition,88 the lower courts have
defined race differently from each other, and inevitably have arrived
at differing conclusions as to the scope of the statutes. One group of
courts has devised a definition of "race" and applied this definition to
exclude the plaintiff from coverage as a matter of law. 9 Another
group of courts has recognized the problems of defining race, but
believes race must be defined to identify those plaintiffs covered under
the statutes. 90 These courts treat racial status as a question of fact,

and place the burden on the plaintiff to prove that he or she falls
84. See T. GOSSETT, supra note 74, at 4-8.
85. See Karst, Paths to Belonging. The Constitution and CulturalIdentity, 64 N.C.L. REV.
303 (1986). This results from a basically normal psychic phenomenon or response. Id. at 30607. People naturally identify themselves with cultural groups to achieve what Karst has
termed a "path to belonging." Id. at 307-09. Once identified with a group, people acquire
their "own acculturated views of the natural order of society." Id. at 309. Distrust of
members of other cultural groups results because their different values and appearances are
threatening. "Discrimination against the ethnic outsider is a form of exclusion .
Id. at
I..."
323. Therefore, the primary cultural group will either force the other group to assimilate or
will relegate it to an inferior status in society. Id. at 311. Restricting definitions of the "races"
to blacks, whites, and other color-defined groups ignores this phenomenon.
86. See id. at 309-11 (discussing distrust and fear among different cultural groups).
87. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In this infamous case, the Supreme
Court held that a Louisiana statute providing for "equal, but separate" accommodations for
whites and blacks in trains did not violate the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. Plessy
was "seven eighths Causasian and one eighth African blood," and "the mixture of colored
blood was not discernible in him." Id. at 541. Nevertheless, he was convicted for refusing to
move to the colored car. Id. at 541-42. The Court concluded that "the proportion of colored
blood necessary to constitute'a colored person, as distinguished from a white person" is a
question of state law. Id. at 552.
88. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.
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within a definition of race designed by the court. Within this group, a
subgroup of courts has abandoned rigid definitional distinctions and
created new classes protected under the statutes. 91
1.

MATTER OF

LAW-Shaare Tefila

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently adopted the
"matter of law" approach in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb.92
In Shaare Tefila, a Jewish congregation brought a section 1982 action
against eight individuals9 3 for desecrating the plaintiffs' synagogue.94
The plaintiffs argued that their claim satisfied the racial character
requirement of the statute because the defendants' actions were motivated by racial animus and premised on a perception of Jews as
racially distinct.9 5 The court held, however, that the plaintiffs could
not base their cause of action on the defendants' irrational
perceptions.
91. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
92. 785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986).
93. On March 16, 1984, the congregation filed suit against the eight defendants in the
United States District Court of Maryland for violations of federal and state law. Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 606 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Md. 1985), afFd, 785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. (1986). In its complaint, the congregation alleged violations of sections
1981, 1982, 1985(3), and claimed trespass, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Maryland common law. Id. at 1505. Upon a motion to dismiss the complaint
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(l) and (6), the district court held that the
Congregation's complaint failed to state federal causes of action because the section 1981 "full
and equal benefit" claim did not involve the requisite state action. Id. at 1507. In addition, the
section 1982 claim was not actionable because discrimination against Jews is not racial
discrimination within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 1507-08. Finally, the 1985(3) charge
was not viable because neither the federal constitutional right to interstate travel nor the
various state rights the Congregation asserted would support a cause of action under the
statute. Id. at 1509-10. Upon the dismissal of the complaint, the Congregation appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
94. On November 2, 1982, the defendants spray-painted the plaintiffs' synagogue in Silver
Spring, Maryland with anti-Semitic slogans such as "Death-to the Jude," "In, Take a Shower
Jew," "Toten Kamf Raband," "Dead Jew," and symbols such as swastikas and Ku Klux Klan
signatures. Id. at 524-25. The racial nature of the defendants' acts in Shaare Tefila is not
anomalous. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reported 638 incidents of antiSemitic vandalism against Jewish homes, businesses, and institutions in 34 states and the
District of Columbia in 1985. Brief for Petitioners at 32, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
(No. 85-2156) (U.S. cert. granted Oct. 6, 1986) (citing ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI
B'RITH, 1985 ANNUAL AUDIT OF ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS 1, 5 (1986)). In Montgomery
County, Maryland (the county where Shaare Tefila Congregation is located), the Human
Relations Commission reported 195 "hate violence incidents (including harassment,
vandalism, assault, arson and cross-burning)" in 1985; 68 of these were directed against Jews.
Id. at 32-33 (citing MONTGOMERY COUNTY [MD] HUMAN RELATONS COMMISSION,
MONTGOMERY COUNTY GOVERNMENT HATE/VIOLENCE INCIDENTS FACT SHEET (Oct. 20,
1986)).
95. Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, 21-30, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, (No. 852156) (U.S. cert. granted Oct. 6, 1986).
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[Plaintiffs] cannot support a claim of racial discrimination solely
on the basis of defendants' perception of Jews as being members of

a racially distinct group. To allow otherwise would permit charges
of racial discrimination to arise out of nothing more than the sub-

jective, irrational perceptions of defendants. Such perceptions
are
96
not what section 1982 was intended to protect against.

The Shaare Tefila court implicitly defined race as a group in society that is commonly treated differently from whites. 9 7 The court
indicated that if the plaintiffs were members of a group "commonly
treated differently from Anglo-Americans," they would have a cause
of action under the statute. 98 The court concluded, however, that
Jews do not share the same position in society as Mexican-Americans

or others commonly considered to be nonwhite. 99 Thus, although the
court applied a definition of race similar to that applied in many of the

recent cases decided under the statute,' ° it determined without factual inquiry that the plaintiffs did not fit within this definition as a
matter of law. The court's ruling effectively precluded the plaintiffs
from showing that they had suffered discrimination that was racial in
nature, or even to prove that they were "commonly perceived" to be a
distinct racial group. 'i In effect, the court took the case from the
96. Shaare Tefila, 785 F.2d at 527. The court failed to support that sweeping statement.
Other courts that have dismissed section 1981 suits without citation or discussion of authority
have been criticized. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 564 n.2 (E.D. Cal.
1982) (criticizing Ponce de Leon v. Western Int'l Hotels, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1394 (N.D. Cal. 1978)).
97. Shaare Tefila, 785 F.2d at 526-27.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 527.
100. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
101. Although anti-Semitism initially stemmed from intolerance of the Jewish religion,
since at least the fifteenth century, anti-Semitism has been predominantly racial in nature. See
B. LEWIS, SEMITES AND ANTI-SEMITES 81 (1986); see also G. GILBERT, NUREMBERG DIARY
(1947) (documenting the Nuremburg defendants' perceptions of Jews); T. GOSSETT, supra
note 74. "Jew hatred was redefined, becoming at first partly, and then, at least in theory,
wholly racial." B. LEWIS, supra, at 81. Historians have extensively documented that antiSemitism is based on the view that Jews constitute a distinct race. Eg. G. GILBERT, supra, at
43; T. GoSSETT, supra note 74, at 9-12, 292-93, 371-72, 449. Anti-Semitism took its most
outrageous form during World War II when Hitler orchestrated the killing of six million Jews.
A fundamental precept of Nazism was that Jews were racially inferior and therefore had to be
eliminated to protect the purity of the Aryan race. See G. GILBERT, supra. Commentators
have described the racial nature of anti-Semitism:
[T]he Jewish people are a religious rather than a racial group in a strictly
scientific sense. But the Nazi attitude and discrimination against the Jews was
[sic] not founded upon their religious practices ... [n]or was this discrimination
based upon national origin ....
[Rather,] [t]he Nazi discrimination against the

Jews was racial in that the Nazis defined the Jews as separate from their "Aryan"
race and maintained that Jews were a physically distinct people.
Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of
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jury, and determined that a Jew can never state a claim under the
statute.
The Shaare Tefila decision illustrates the problem associated
with determining the scope of the statutes by attempting to define
race. The court's approach is misguided because its definition of race
has no basis in science, legal doctrine, or the statutes' legislative history. Indeed, the court failed to cite any cases to support its conclusion. As a result, its decision that the plaintiff fell outside the
definition is highly questionable.
Nevertheless, several other courts have taken a similar approach
to the statutes. Typically, these courts have held that allegations
under section 1981 or 1982 based primarily or exclusively on national
origin are insufficient to maintain an action because the statutes cover
only racial discrimination. 10 2 For example, in Budinsky v. Corning
1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662, 677-78 (1975). Hitler documented these misconceptions in his
own publications. He wrote: "The Jew has always been a people with definite racial characA. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 306 (R. Manheim trans. 1943).
teristics and never a religion .
He further stated:
The Jewish State was never spatially limited in itself, but universally unlimited as
to space, though restricted in the sense of embracing but one race.... It is one of
the most ingenious tricks that was ever devised, to make this state sail under the
flag of "religion," thus assuring it of the tolerance which the Aryan is always
ready to accord a religious creed. For actually the Mosaic religion is nothing
other than a doctrine for the preservation of the Jewish race.
Id. at 150. Several groups in the United States have adopted the Nazi belief that Jews constitute a distinct race. These groups publicly advocate and practice racial violence against Jews.
For example, one Neo-Nazi group, the National Socialist Party of America, declared: "The
single serious enemy facing the White man is the Jew. The Jews are not a religion, they are an
Asiatic race, locked in mortal conflict with Aryan man which has lasted for millenia, and
which will continue until one of the two combat peoples is extinct." Covington, 10 Fundamentals of National Socialism, THE NEW ORDER, Mar. 1979, at 3. Another organization, Aryan
Nations, alarmed its readers: "Aryans Awake! Jews are the Race of Satan!" Brief for Petitioners at 31 (citing ARYAN NATIONS, No. 30 at 8 (R. Butler ed. 1983)).
102. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1976)
(concluding that because the plaintiffs alleged discrimination based on national origin without
an allegation of racial discrimination, they failed to state a claim under the statute). In
Schetter v. Heim, the court noted:
The clear purpose of these sections [1981 and 1982] is to provide for equality
between persons of different races. In order for a plaintiff to predicate an action
on either of these sections, he must have been deprived of a right which, under
similar circumstances, would have been accorded to a person of a different race.
These sections are clearly limited to racial discrimination-they do not pertain to
discrimination on grounds of religion or national origin.
300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (citations omitted). The court then concluded that
"[t]here being no allegations of racial discrimination in the record ... §§ 1981 and 1982 fail to
confer jurisdiction upon this court." Id.; see also Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F.
Supp. 865, 867 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("The plaintiff's allegations in the instant matter being based
solely on a claim for discrimination based on national origin are not within the confines or
scope of 42 United States Code, Section 1981, and therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to
consider any claims thereunder."). In Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the court took a formal-
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Glass Works, 0 3 the court denied section 1981 protection to a plaintiff
of Slavic origin who alleged national origin discrimination. The court
conceded that it could not define "race" scientifically. Nevertheless,
it held that the plaintiff was not part of a group that has been commonly subject, "however inaccurately or stupidly," to racial identification as a nonwhite.1°4
The Budinsky court dismissed the plaintiff's plea for an expansive reading of section 1981 to account for changed times:
Thus, plaintiff submits, § 1981 should not stand alone among the
post-war Civil Rights Acts as frozen by a wording and legislative
history written before the great influx of white European immigrants to this country, but should be expanded to protect all
groups of potential discriminatees who are identifiable as a "race"
or "nationality," or by "national origin."' 5
The court found that it was more appropriate to expand the statute
for groups such as Indians and Hispanics who "have been traditional
victims of group discrimination."1 0 6 The court stated that "[tihere is
accordingly both a practical need and a logical reason to extend
10 7
§ 1981's proscription" against discrimination to these groups.
"The same cannot be said with regard to persons of Slavic or Italian
istic approach to the plaintiff's national origin claim in dismissing it for failure to state a
"racial" cause of action. 448 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Although the court recognized
that Puerto Rican-Americans, Cuban-Americans, and other Hispanic peoples have been subject to "discrimination like unto racial discrimination," the court nevertheless rejected the
plaintiff's claim for relief under section 1981. Id. at 613. The court concluded, "[T]his court
is not prepared to hold that Plaintiffs, being of Puerto Rican background, have stated a cause
of action for racial discrimination as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Id.
103. 425 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
104. Id. at 788. The court adopted this view of race even though, given the opportunity, the
plaintiff might have been able to prove his way into the court's definitional boundary at trial.
Although it is quite possible that the court chose a narrow definition of race because of a fear
of opening the "floodgates of litigation," it is equally possible that the court felt it did not
possess or was not comfortable exercising expansive powers in interpreting the statute. This
attitude would reflect the court's belief that expansion of the statute is for Congress. In Jones
v. United Gas Improvement, the court defined racial discrimination for purposes of section
1981 as requiring a showing that the plaintiff is a member of a group that is denied the rights
enumerated in the statute "to the extent that such rights are enjoyed by white citizens of this
nation." 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The court in United Gas drew a sharp distinction
between national origin and racial discrimination, holding that, as a matter of law, alleged
discrimination against Spanish-surnamed individuals must be categorized as discrimination
based on national origin. Id. Finally, in Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical & Diagnostic
Center, the court held as a matter of law that a Ukrainian-born plaintiff could not maintain a
cause of action under section 1981 against her white employers, because "Ukrainians are not
considered a race separate from that of the caucasian race." 467 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Minn.
1979).
105. 425 F. Supp. 786, 788.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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or Jewish origin. These groups are not so commonly identified as
'races' nor as frequently subject to 'racial' discrimination which is the
specific and exclusive target of § 1981."9108
The Budinsky court is also typical of other courts in maintaining
that because the plaintiff could seek an alternative remedy, the court
need not apply the statute to afford protection to the plaintiff. The
court emphasized that its decision might have been different if the
plaintiff had not invoked Title VII. °9 On the facts of this case, however, the court found "neither need nor justification for judicially legislating § 1981."' 110
2.

QUESTION OF FACT-Al-Khazraji

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently adopted
the "question of fact" approach. In Al-Khazraji v. Saint FrancisCol-

lege,III a college professor brought an action against his employers
under section 1981 alleging that the college's decision to deny him
tenure resulted from religious and national origin discrimination. The
court made two separate determinations: races can be identified, and

the issue of whether the plaintiff is part of a group that is commonly
perceived to be a distinct race is a question of fact for the jury to
12
decide.'
108. Id.
109. Id. at 788-89. Some courts deny recovery because they view Title VII as providing an
alternative remedy. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); see Martinez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding there was no "practical
need [or] logical reason" to extend section 1981 to national origin discrimination as other
courts had done "because Congress has provided protection for persons affected because of
national origin in ... Title VII"). Additionally, in Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the limited
application of section 1981 was due in large part to the court's belief that the plaintiff's remedy
was more appropriately sought under Title VII. 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1978). By
contrast, the court in Ortiz v. Bank of America remarked: "While it is true that many persons
alleging causes of action under section 1981 may also have a claim under Title VII it is difficult
for this court to perceive how that fact has any relevancy to determining the appropriate scope
of section 1981." 547 F. Supp. 550, 564 n.21 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The Supreme Court has
directly addressed this issue: "Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against
private employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate and
time-consuming procedures of Title VII." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
466 (1975). Moreover, cases like Shaare Tefila indicate that Title VII is not an adequate
substitute because racist actions are not limited to the employment context.
110. Budinsky, 425 F. Supp. at 789.
111. 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986).
112. Id. The court stated:
We are unwilling to assert that Arabs cannot be the victims of racial prejudice:
"prejudice is as irrational as is the selection of groups against whom it is directed.
It is thus a matter of practice or attitude in the community, it is a usage or image
based on all the mistaken concepts of 'race.' "
Id. at 517 (quoting Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979)).
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Identifying Races

In making its first determination, that races can be identified, the
court reviewed the legislative history of section 1981. The court
expressed its view that Congress did not intend to restrict coverage
only to those who are discriminated against as part of a group that
scientists would identify as racially distinct. 13 Instead, the court contended, Congress intended to "ensure that all persons be treated
equally, without regard to color or race.""' 4 The court expressly
stated that race could not be precisely defined and that, for purposes
of section 1981, distinctions between racial and
other types of discrim''t 5
"obscure."
be
may
cases
some
in
ination
The court argued that recognition of the problems associated
with defining race do not preclude an attempt to distinguish between
national origin and racial discrimination. The court defined racial
discrimination as "discrimination

directed against an individual

because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens."" 6

The Al-Khazraji court relied on Manzanares v. Safeway Stores,
Inc.' 17 to include ethnic groups as protected parties under the statute."1 8 The Al-Khazraji court did not, however, go as far as many
other federal courts' ' 9 that have read Manzanares more expansively,
113. Id. at 516.
114. Id. at 517.
115. Id.
116. Id. Although the court's definition allows for expansion of the statute, it is too narrow
because it fails to consider the full range of factors that may provide a basis for human
differentiation. The definition requires a showing of physiognomic distinction, a factor that is
not necessarily present in many cases of racial discrimination. See supra notes 70-86 and
accompanying text. The court's definition, however, was broader than the definition of those
courts that have held as a matter of law that racial discrimination involves differences in skin
color only.
117. 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979).
118. The Manzanares court maintained: "Prejudice is as irrational as is the selection of
groups against whom it is directed. It is thus a matter of practice or attitude in the
community, it is usage or image based on all the mistaken concepts of 'race.'" 593 F.2d at
971. The court emphasized that "[tihe allegations demonstrate that the defendants may be
poor anthropologists, but the prejudice is asserted to be directed against plaintiff in contrast to
the Anglos. This in our view is sufficient." Id.
119. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979)
(plaintiff of Mexican descent with brown skin color); Banker v. Time Chem., Inc., 579 F. Supp.
1183 (N.D. II1.1983) (East Indian plaintiff); Pollard v. City of Hartford, 539 F. Supp. 1156 (D.
Cont. 1982) (Hispanic); Baruah v. Young, 536 F. Supp. 356 (D. Md. 1982) (nonwhite native
of India); Madrigal v. Certainteed Corp., 508 F. Supp. 310, 311 (W.D. Miss. 1981) (The court
allowed a Mexican American to sue under section 1981, applying the following rule: "Section
1981 should be construed to offer protection to persons who are the objects of discrimination
because prejudiced persons may perceive them to be nonwhite, even though such racial
characterization may be unsound or debatable."); Aponte v. National Steel Serv. Center, 500
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and that do not require a showing of physiognomical distinctiveness.

For example, the Al-Khazraji court recognized the contrary decision
in Ortiz v. Bank of America. 2 ' The Ortiz court found it impossible to

distinguish between national origin and racial discrimination because
race is a subjective concept that cannot be objectively conceived.
"The notion of race is a taxonomic device and, as with all such constructs, it exists in the human mind [and] not as a division in the
objective universe. 121 The court in Manzanares noted that "[t]he
term 'race' in our language has evolved to encompass some non-racial
but ethnic groups," 122 and held that section 1981 "is not necessarily
limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of 'race.' ",123 Ortiz
expanded on this point:
This application is in keeping with Congress' intent of guaranteeing the same civil rights to all citizens .... Thus it extends section
1981's protections to those persons who today are members of
groups that, like the then recently freed slaves, are in a position far
from equal to that of the majority, historically "white citizens."
Moreover, by hinging the "identifiable group" standard on the
"common perception" of the group in question, the Manzanares
approach employs the common law technique of the application of
law to changes in the factual reality while limiting the scope of the
statute in24 a way consistent with the apparent intent of its
drafters. 1

This expansive approach to the statutes entails eliminating arbitrary distinctions between the different forms of discrimination, and
requiring that the plaintiff present sufficient evidence to prove that the
discrimination was racial in nature.'25 For example, in Cubas v.
F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Hispanic); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302 (W.D.N.Y.
1980) (Pakistani-American); Lopez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1980)
(nonwhite plaintiff with a spanish surname); Ridgeway v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers,
1979) (Hispanic).
466 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill.
120. 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
121. Id. at 565, cited in Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 517. In Ortiz, the plaintiff alleged
employment discrimination on the basis of her Puerto Rican ancestry. The court held that the
plaintiff should have the opportunity to show at trial that she had been treated differently than
the group enjoying the broadest rights. The Ortiz court stated: "Groups being so
discriminated against vary in accordance with the historical context. Thus the appropriate
means of definition involve inclusive but not exclusive criteria. Because the issue of racial
classification is dynamic and not static no group is necessarily excluded." 547 F. Supp. at 567-

68.
122. Manzanares, 593 F.2d at 970. The Manzanares court stated: "[W]e consider that
Mexican American, Spanish American, Spanish-surnamed individuals, and Hispanos [sic] are
equivalents, and it makes no difference whether these are terms of national origin, alienage, or
whatever." Id. at 970.

123. Id. at 971.
124. Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 564.
125. See Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980) (Iranian
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Rapid American Corp., 126 the court determined that, in many cases,
allegations of national origin discrimination may involve the element
of racial animus. 12 The court therefore held that "[n]ational origin
discrimination is actionable only to the extent that it is motivated by
or indistinguishable from racial discrimination.... Hispanic Americans claiming that they have been discriminated against in violation
of § 1981 are entitled to introduce evidence to prove that the alleged
discrimination was racial in character."' 28 The Cubas decision
reflects the direction in which the courts are moving with regard to
determining protected parties under the statutes.
b.

Common Perception

The Al-Khazraji court concluded that the plaintiff might fall
within its definition of race. It then determined that the plaintiff's
racial status was a question for the jury to decide. 129 This determination was consistent with recent lower court decisions. The court
expressly refused to hold as a matter of law that Arabs cannot be
subjected to discrimination that is racial in nature. The Al-Khazraji
plaintiffs may state a cause of action under section 1981 notwithstanding allegations of
national origin discrimination only.).
126. 420 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
127. Id. at 666.
128. Id. at 665. This approach is reasonable because it recognizes that the phenomenon of
racial discrimination is often linked to national origin. A federal remedy is therefore available
for a plaintiff alleging discrimination based on national origin if he proves at trial that the
discrimination was racial in nature. The potential for expansion under such a legal principle is
extraordinary. The Cubas court exemplifies those courts that believe the function of the
judiciary is to reinterpret the scope of the statute in light of changed circumstances in society.
See also Bullard v. Omi Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. Unit B March 1981). In Bullard,
the district court granted defendant's summary judgment motion because it concluded that the
action was based on national origin discrimination. Id. at 634-35. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
held that although national origin discrimination alone is not enough to bring the plaintiff
under the Act, the court must still give the plaintiff a chance to prove at trial that he was
discriminated against based on race. Not surprisingly, the court did not provide any guidance
on how the plaintiff is to prove "racial" discrimination separate from national origin
discrimination. The court hinted, however, that the plaintiff may be required to prove that he
is a member of such an identifiable group that treatment afforded its members may be
measured against that afforded Anglos. Id. at 634. The Bullard court concluded that the
"[a]ppellants have stated and supported a case of racial discrimination. The line between
national origin discrimination and racial discrimination is an extremely difficult one to trace.
An attempt to make such a demarcation before both parties have had an opportunity to offer
evidence at trial is inappropriate." Id. at 634-35; see also Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 901 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (plaintiff alleged national origin discrimination as a MexicanAmerican). The Enriquez court stated: "The fact is the line between discrimination on
account of race and discrimination on account of national origin may be so thin as to be
indiscernible; indeed, to state the matter more succinctly, there may in some instances be
overlap." Id. at 904.
129. AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 62 (1986).
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court concluded that "where a plaintiff comes into federal court and
claims that he has been discriminated against because of his race, we
will not force him first to prove his pedigree. '"1 10

There are several cases that support the Al-Khazraji court's
determination although it did not cite them. These cases have held
that when a plaintiff has insufficiently alleged racial violations of section 1981 or 1982, the plaintiff may replead and/or prove at trial that
the discrimination was in fact racially motivated.", For example, in
Apodaca v. General Electric Co., 132 the court held that "[i]f a Spanish
surnamed plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of race, the
issues as to the defendant's perception and animus are factual and are
not to be determined by the court from the pleadings. "133
If the plaintiff's recovery hinges on his or her racial status, the
Al-Khazraji approach is more just than the Shaare Tefila approach.
The Al-Khazraji approach gives the plaintiff the opportunity to prove
at trial that he or she meets the court's "racial" criteria. By comparison, the Shaare Tefila approach means that the protection afforded to
victims of racially and ethnically motivated discrimination is entirely
dependent on the judge's perceptions.
IV.

COMMENT

The significance of Shaare Tefila and Al-Khazraji for the
Supreme Court is more than a simple matter of statutory construction. These cases will be the first Supreme Court rulings on the scope
of protection under sections 1981 and 1982 for ethnic and cultural
groups. The language and the legislative history of the statutes do not
a decidirect the Court to a decision as to their scope.1 34 Therefore,
35
unpersuasive.
be
would
sources
these
sion based on
130. Id. at 517. The court made this statement despite its requirement that the plaintiff
belong to an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive group, which would seem to require
at least a visual type of verification.
131. See Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Gonzalez, a Mexican-American plaintiff alleged discrimination based on national origin. In
granting the plaintiff the opportunity at trial to prove the discrimination was, in fact, racially
motivated, the court held:
We take note of the fact that a substantial portion of the Mexican population
traces its roots to a mixture of the Caucasian (Spanish) and native American
races. With this background prejudice towards those of Mexican descent having
a skin color not characteristically Caucasian must be said to be racial prejudice
under § 1981.

Id. at 1300.
132. 445 F. Supp. 821 (D.N.M. 1978).
133. Id. at 823.
134. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
135. In prior rulings on the statutes, the Court's reading of the legislative history has
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The lower courts have turned to definitions of race to identify the
persons protected under the statutes. ' 36 The Shaare Tefila test hinges
recovery on the plaintiff's membership in a group that society "commonly perceives" as nonwhite. 3 7 The defendant is liable only if society shares his view that the plaintiff is a member of a distinct race.
The Al-Khazraji test hinges recovery on the plaintiff's membership in
a physiognomically and ethnologically distinct group. 3 s The defendant is liable only if society shares his perceptions of the common characteristics of the group to which the plaintiff belongs. Both tests are
therefore group-based and status-oriented.
A. Learningfrom the Lower Courts-Problemswith
the Group-Based Rules
The lower courts' treatment of the issue on a case by case basis
can provide a starting point for the Supreme Court's analysis. 39 The
lower courts have begun to recognize the problems associated with
defining race.' 40 The main difficulty is that the courts lack judicially
manageable standards for defining race. Race is an inherently indefinable concept; it has no fixed meaning over time. 'I' Because racial discrimination is always the product of subjective perceptions, it is
irrational to require a rational basis for the defendant's perceptions.
created controversy both inside and outside the Court. See supra note 46 and accompanying
text. Critics claim that the Court has misread the history, or that the history could support a
decision either way. For example, one historian stated:
In Jones v. Mayer the Court appears to have had no feeling for the truth of
history, but only to have read it through the glass of the Court's own purpose. It
allowed itself to believe impossible things-as though the dawning enlightenment
of 1968 could be ascribed to the Congress of a century agone.
6 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 1258 (1971) (comparing the
Court's reading of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), to illusions in L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (Oxford 1982)). The Court must guard against the
perception that it is manipulating the legislative sources to reach the outcome it desires. "The
Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
136. See supra notes 88-133 and accompanying text.
137. In Shaare Tefila, the court treated the determination of race as a question of law. See
supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
138. The AI-Khazraji court treated the determination of race as a question of fact. See
supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
139. In drawing from the lower court decisions, the Supreme Court can benefit from the
common law method of the lower courts without the restrictions of binding precedent. Cf
Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 564 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (praising "the common law
technique of the application of law to changes in the factual reality while limiting the scope of
the statute in a way consistent with the apparent intent of its drafters").
140. See supra notes 88-133 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
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Even if the Court finds it necessary to identify race as society
perceives it, several hurdles to a fair and workable rule remain. To
define race without the assistance of expert testimony would be
imprudent because it would effectively establish the Court as the official mouthpiece of societal perceptions. Further, in devising a rule,
the Court would have to decide between a national and a regional
standard. A national test for identifying groups perceived as races
would lead to anomalous results because of the ethnic differences in
communities. Alternatively, the Court could devise a locality rule in
42
which it would incorporate local or regional perceptions of race.'
This rule would account for the different perceptions that arise in
communities with different ethnic makeups, but would still condition
the plaintiff's recovery on group status.
By hinging the plaintiff's recovery on his or her membership in a
racial group, proponents of a group-based rule effectively ask the
courts to withold a remedy until widespread discrimination against a
particular group exists. The Supreme Court should not require that
the extent of racial discrimination against particular groups reach
some level of discrimination such as that directed against blacks in
1866 before affording a federal remedy. To do so would implicitly
grant judicial approval to racial discrimination below that level and
unnecessarily afford judicial tolerance to discrimination. The Shaare
Tefila court did not even delineate the proportion of society that
would constitute a common perception that Jews are a racially distinct group.
Limiting recovery on a group basis is misguided because it bases
the rule on commonality of injury. Because the plaintiff's recovery
under this rule depends on the existence of an injured group in society,
the rule operates to preclude relief in otherwise valid individual cases.
It is ironic that a court allows a defendant to use a group-based
test to insulate discriminatory behavior from federal censure merely
because these discriminatory beliefs are not widely shared in society.
The perpetrator of the offense should not be absolved merely because
others do not share his or her prejudice. Thus, the Court should not
furnish the offender with the defense that his or her prejudice was not
shared by some judicially cognizable sector of society. The Shaare
Tefila court has justified a group-based rule with the claim that granting a federal remedy in the absence of a scientific or societal basis for
the defendant's prejudices makes federal jurisdiction turn on the irra142. Cf. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979) (Prejudice "is
thus a matter of practice or attitude in the community, it is usage or image based on all the
mistaken concepts of 'race.' ") (emphasis added).
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tional perceptions of the defendant.' 43 This overlooks the fact that in
a discrimination case, the cause of action (and hence jurisdiction)
always turns on the defendant's perceptions, rational or irrational.' 44
B. Beyond the Lower Courts-The Casefor a
Racial Content Analysis
Because the courts cannot define the scope of the statutes by
identifying "races," they must focus on the essence of racial discrimination. The latter approach is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the 1866 Act' 45-to provide a remedy for racial discrimination in
society. Racial discrimination is invidious in nature and therefore has
received special attention in Congress and the courts. Racial discrimination originates from a belief that the human race is hierarchically
structured. This belief in an existing "caste system" assumes that
some groups are inferior. 14 6 Discriminatory acts injure the plaintiff by
excluding him or her from the favored group. 147 In most discrimination cases, the defendant is favoring a person from one type of group
143. Shaare Tefila, 785 F.2d at 527.
144. Taking the Shaare Tefila approach to its logical extreme illustrates the fundamental
illogic of the group-based rule. Consider the following examples: (1) A is Caucasian, B is
Mexican-American. A correctly perceives B as a Mexican-American and discriminates against
him on this basis. Society commonly perceives Mexican-Americans to be a race. (2) C is
Caucasian and D, from Naples, Italy. C calls D a "dirty, greasy wop," and makes a comment
about protecting America. Society no longer perceives Italians to be a racial group.
Under the group-based rule of the Shaare Tefila court, plaintiff B is entitled to sue under
section 1981 or 1982 because the defendant's perceptions had a rational basis in society.
Plaintiff D would not be able to sue under the statutes, although skin color and prejudicial
assumptions were motivating factors. The central arbitrariness of this approach is that B and
D have suffered the same injury, and yet the courts only afford a remedy to B.
The group-based rule also assumes that each individual has a single racial identity.
Because society is racially and culturally heterogeneous, however, its members sometimes
identify one individual with different racial groups. The following story illustrates this
phenomenon. In 1983, Theresa Mulqueen Skeeter unsuccessfully sued Suffolk, VA officials,
claiming that they discriminated against her because she was black. Miami Herald, Apr. 8,
1987, at 10B, col. 1. In rejecting Skeeter's claim, the judge stated, "I see your mother and I see
your father ... I can't find where you would have any basis for calling yourself black." Id.
Skeeter filed a separate suit four years later against Norfolk officials, now claiming that she was
discriminated against because she was white. Id. Skeeter alleged that blacks were promoted
ahead of her, and that after she was transferred to a black neighborhood, a supervisor told her
that she would "get nowhere because she was a white woman." Answering the complaint,
Norfolk officials disclosed that Skeeter's birth certificate lists her race and her parents' race as
"colored." Id. The case was still pending as of this writing.
145. See Foy, supra note 19, at 520. Judge Learned Hand termed this the "proliferation of
purpose" principle. Id.; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 138, 163 (1803) ("Where
there is a legal right there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded.... The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.").
146. See Karst, supra note 85, at 321 & n.112.
147. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger. The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
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over a person from another. These groups are often readily identifiable. 14 8 In racial discrimination cases, however, the problem of identification hinders objective categorization of people into racial types or
groups. ' 49 The subjectivity of race and ethnicity requires a shift away
from the racial status of the plaintiff to the defendant's acts. Because
courts cannot always recognize discrimination as racial by determining the plaintiff's status, some other means of identification must be
applied. This Comment proposes that a plaintiff be able to invoke
statutory protection if the defendant's discriminatory acts have racial
content. The content is racial if the acts communicate that the plaintiff is a member of a group that shares a genetic makeup distinct from

150
some comparative group.
The content analysis test allows a court to weigh evidence objectively without relying on its own perceptions. A court may analyze
the totality of the circumstances and consider discovery evidence,
documentary evidence, and expert testimony by ethnologists and sociologists to determine whether the discrimination was racial in
nature.' 5 ' For example, in Shaare Tefila, the symbols and slogans
that the defendants used were Nazi-inspired and anti-Semitic; they
invoked a racist ideology. A detailed factual inquiry is consistent
with the fact-sensitive nature of all racial discrimination claims. 152
The defendant's expression of the plaintiff's separate racial idenLaw's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. - (1987); see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
148. For example, plaintiffs in sex discrimination claims fortuitously benefit from the ease
of classifying people into the gender-based groups of men and women.
149. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall illustrated this point
during oral arguments for Shaare Tefila. The respondent claimed that races might be
identified by immutable traits such as skin color. Justice Marshall responded that his father
was fair-skinned and could not be racially identified by skin color although he was "aNegro."
Oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States, Shaare Tefila (No. 85-2156)
(oral argument held Feb. 25, 1987). The plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson also had fair skin yet
was made to sit in the black railway coach because he was one-eighth African. 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
150. This has not been communicated if there is no link between the racial nature of the act
and the plaintiff. For example, a defendant who directs anti-Semitic discrimination against
Christians has not inflicted the injury of racial discrimination.
151. Admissions, previous racist acts of the defendant, the defendant's associations with
racist groups, and racial stereotypes should all be relevant. The court could also apply
techniques from analogous causes of action such as Title VII and equal protection claims that
assist courts in making evidentiary findings: inferences, disparate impact, and shifting burdens
of proof.
152. Because findings of fact can only be overturned if clearly erroneous, they are often
insulated from review and effectively depend on the receptiveness of the trial court or jury.
See, e.g., Comment, McCleskey v. Kemp: Constitutional Tolerance for Racially Disparate
CapitalSentencing, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 (1986) (discussing problems associated with the
use of statistics to prove racial discrimination in capital sentencing).
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tity need not have a scientific basis, and society need not accept the
view as valid. A court therefore should not inquire whether society
commonly perceives the plaintiff to belong to a separate race. 153 Nor
need the defendant actually believe that the plaintiff is racially distinct, although usually he or she will so believe. A court would look
to society only to determine whether the defendant's discriminatory
acts invoked a, racist ideology. Society therefore acts as the rational
identifier of what constitutes racial discrimination. A court should
also not require a direct showing of racial animus. 15 4 In the majority
of cases, if the acts were racial in nature, the defendant would have
been acting out of racial animus. Rarely does a person invoke an ideology without personally subscribing to its underlying tenets.
Because racial discrimination is emotional, however, racist beliefs can
override conflicting rational knowledge. As Justice Scalia has suggested, a sophisticated defendant may therefore direct racial acts at a
153. The appellant illustrated this point during oral arguments. When the respondent
argued that the defendant's perceptions must be commonly shared, the appellant asked:
"What are we going to do, take a Gallup poll?" Oral argument before the Supreme Court of
the United States, Shaare Tefila (No. 85-2156) (oral argument held Feb. 25, 1987).
154. The Court has already indicated that intent may be a necessary element of a section
1981 or 1982 claim. In General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court held that contractors and their trade association could not be held liable under
section 1981 for the intentional racial discrimination of the local union and the joint
apprenticeship training committee. 458 U.S. 375 (1982). The Court refused to find that
section 1981 imposes a "nondelegable duty" to ensure that discrimination does not occur in
the selection of the work force. Id. at 395-97. In doing so, the Court imposed the intent
element of the equal protection clause from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977), onto the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
Court dismissed the thirteenth amendment origins of the Act, finding "no convincing
evidence" that Congress intended this amendment to reach further than the fourteenth
amendment. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 391. The Court further found that
the elements of vicarious liability were lacking. Id. at 391-95.
Judicial imposition of a discriminatory intent element in equal protection and statutory
areas has provoked widespread criticism. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 152 (criticizing the
imposition of an intent requirement in eighth amendment and equal protection challenges to
capital sentencing alleging discrimination based on the race of the victim); cf Note,
DiscriminatoryPurpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE
L.J. 111 (1983) (comparing intent requirement in equal protection and criminal contexts and
concluding that it should be relaxed in the equal protection context); see also UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980's: DISMANTLING THE
PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 8 (1981) ("Although open and intentional prejudice persists,
individual discriminatory conduct is often hidden and sometimes unintentional."); Fiss, A
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 266 (1971) (An "admission is, of
course, unlikely, especially where social mores disapprove of the conduct prohibited by the
law."); Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 31
(1982). (The Supreme Court needs to recognize the unconstitutionality of both discriminatory
means and discriminatory goals.); Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a DiscriminatoryPurpose:
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 334 (1986) (The goal of equal
protection, to protect against official discrimination, is hindered by requiring proof of overt
discriminatory purpose; the impact/inference standard better meets this goal.).
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plaintiff without intellectually espousing racist views.' 5 5 For example,
an ethnologist, who has professional knowledge that Jews are not a
race, may nonetheless engage in anti-Semitic acts, thereby inflicting
the same injury on the Jewish plaintiff. A court should therefore not
require proof that the defendant viewed the plaintiff as a member of a
distinct race. 56
A court should not preclude recovery merely because the plaintiff belongs to a group that may be identified by nonracial traits such
as religion or national origin when the discrimination is racial in
nature. For example, the fact that the racial discrimination was also,
simultaneously, religious discrimination in its operation should not
preclude relief, if the acts had racial content. Thus, a Jew, an Italian,
and a black who suffer the same injury of racial discrimination should
all fall within the scope of the statutes. The test should focus on the
nature of the plaintiff's injury, not on the plaintiff's status.
It may be argued that the Supreme Court should not adopt a test
that is based on the racial content of the defendant's discriminatory
acts because this might open the "floodgates of litigation." Yet, it is
the Court's duty to decide the case before it.' 57 The Court should not
abdicate this duty merely because the dockets are overburdened.
Indeed, as Justice Tobriner once stated, "The existence of a multitude8
of claims merely shows society's pressing need for legal redress."' 1
One could also make the argument that redressing claims before discrimination against a particular group becomes rooted in society will
deter future discrimination, and consequently prevent lawsuits.
Judicial resources... are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising
from budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in
155. Oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States, Shaare Tefila (No. 852156) (oral argument held Feb. 25, 1987).
156. See id.; Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 622 n.4 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring). The Court should also not require direct proof of intent, because motive is too
difficult to prove; the defendant's subconscious is inaccessible. An intent requirement

effectively insulates acts that perpetuate racist ideologies. See, e.g, General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
157. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 138, 178 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); The T. J.Hooper, 60
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.) ("Courts must in the end say what is required; there
are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.").
158. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 735 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 n.3, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n.3
(1968).
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the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional
principles.' 5 9
Whichever way it rules, the Court will inevitably encounter
charges of judicial legislation. The Court cannot know whom the
Reconstruction Congress intended to protect when it passed the 1866
Act. The dilemma the Court faces is only a more pronounced version
of the problem it faces in every case requiring statutory construction
because this task inherently involves separation of powers concerns."
Congress cannot, precisely delineate or legislate for every set of facts
that a plaintiff may present to a court. Thus, a court almost always
must read meaning into the text of a statute in order to apply it to the
specific case. The Supreme Court cannot escape this dilemma by
denying relief and maintaining the status quo scope of the statutes. 161
A narrow statutory construction could be viewed as judicial legislation because the Court would be subtracting from the text and thereby
frustrating legislative intent. Congress may have intended the Act to
protect all victims of racial discrimination. If so, the Court would be
frustrating legislative intent by denying relief. To construe the statutes narrowly would also give effect to views that are repugnant to the
guaranties of civil liberty and equal protection of the laws. 162 One
Reconstruction senator expressed such unacceptable views in the
debates over the Act: "A man may be a free man and not possess the
same civil rights as other men." 163 Today's society does not and cannot accept that sentiment because it is in conflict with our basic constitutional ideals.
The Court has demonstrated that it is not afraid to read the legislative history and text of the statutes broadly to provide a remedy
when state remedial schemes fail. 164 Nor has it hesitated to respond
159. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
160. Cf id. at 411-30 (Burger, C.J., Black & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (claims of judicial
activism in the implication of a private right of action under the fourth amendment-of the
Constitution).
161. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (establishing a principle of statutory
interpretation in favor of federal remedial power to protect federal rights).
162.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
163. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 477 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury).
164. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Arguably, 120-year-old
legislative history should not be outcome-determinative in the courtroom today. See, e.g.,
Levinson, New Perspectiveson the Reconstruction Court, 26 STAN. L. REV. 461, 481-83 (1974)
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to society's increasing disapproval of racial and ethnic discrimination. 6 5 The Court has also pointed to congressional remarks indicat-

ing that the fourteenth amendment was designed to incorporate the

guaranties of the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution. 166 If this
assessment is accurate, then the Act would have a quasi-constitutional

status. This would warrant a broad reading of the language of the
statutes in much the same manner as construction of constitutional
provisions.
The racial content test would not suffer from the drawbacks of
the group-based rules. It does not require the defendant's perceptions

to be objectively based in science or commonly shared in society, and
therefore would not present a court with the judicially unmanageable
task of defining race. This, in turn, would protect the integrity of the
judicial system because the courts would not have to become involved
with the question of certifying races or "pedigrees." The test would
not arbitrarily restrict remedies, but rather would provide the same
remedy to all who have suffered the same injury. In this manner, the
statutes would provide a federal remedy for all victims of racial

discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

Racial discrimination is a complex phenomenon. As the ethnic
makeup of society changes, racial perceptions change accordingly.
Consequently, society tends to categorize people ifito new racial
groups. For this reason, rigid definitions of race are no longer effective tools for determining the scope of coverage under sections 1981
(reviewing 6 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION & REUNION, 1864-88 (1971)); Comment, supra
note 23, at 48-49, 68-69; see also Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 556 n.7 (E.D. Cal.
1982) ("[T]he courts have no choice ... the notion of 'race' is a dynamic concept which
compels addressing the question in terms of the reality of present day group-to-group
relations.").
165. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the
Internal Revenue Service's denial of tax-exempt status to a private nonprofit university because
of its racially discriminatory admissions policy even though Congress had not spoken to this
issue in the Code. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Court based this holding on its view that "racial
discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice."
Id. at 592; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("For even if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it
surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice today.").
166. See supra note 35. In Hurd v. Hodges, the Court noted:
The 1866 Act represented Congress' first attempt to ensure equal rights for the
freedmen following the formal abolition of slavery effected by the Thirteenth
Amendment. As such, it constituted an initial blueprint of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which Congress proposed in part as a means of "incorporat[ing]
the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of the land."
334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948).
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and 1982. At least one Reconstruction congressman envisioned the
future waves of immigration to the United States and expressed his
view that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would "protect every citizen,
including the millions of people of foreign birth who will flock to our
shores."' 67 Recognizing that this congressman's vision has become
reality, many of the lower courts have rejected the definitional
approach to determining statutory protection. In many cases, however, the rules favored by these courts have conflicted with each other
in their application. Because victims of racial discrimination are
equally entitled to a federal remedy, the Supreme Court should shift
the focus from the plaintiff's racial status to the racial content of the
defendant's actions. Applying such a rule, the Court can resolve the
conflict of the lower courts and, at the same time, establish a principle
that affords a remedy for all victims of racial discrimination.
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